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ABSTRACT
This article attempts to explain the relatively poor productivity growth in four major EU
countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom, and Netherlands) relative to the United States.
Our study is carried out from a sectoral perspective, focussing on the financial and business
services sectors. Instead of examining only sectoral productivity growth rates, we also
examine sectoral productivity level gaps. Our results imply that the productivity differential
in the business services sector is a major factor behind the US lead in productivity.
THIS ARTICLE AIMS AT CONTRIBUTING to the
explanations underlying the relatively poor
productivity performance of European coun-
tries. Over the last decade, the United States
has displayed productivity growth rates that are
substantially above those observed in continen-
tal Europe. Van Ark et al. (2008) find for exam-
ple that in the United States productivity
growth increased from 1.2 per cent per year
between 1973 and 1995 to 2.3 per cent per year
in the 1995-2006 period. Over the same period,
annual productivity growth in Europe declined
from 2.4 per cent between 1973 and 1995 to 1.5
per cent during the second period.
Numerous authors have discussed the under-
lying reasons for this differential. In that regard,
information and communication technologies
(ICT) seem to have been of outstanding impor-
tance for the evolution of productivity over the
last two decades (Oliner and Sichel, 2002). In
particular, Jorgenson et al. (2007a) claim that in
the late 1990s, the productivity differential in
favour of the United States originated in ICT
producing industries. This changed after the dot-
com crash in 2000. Since then, the industries
intensively using ICT capital have accounted for
the differences in productivity growth and levels
between the United States and the European
economies.
A second factor put forward to explain the
divergence in productivity dynamics between
the two regions is total factor productivity. TFP
growth seems to have been substantially higher
in the United States. As most authors assert, this
seems to hinge principally on more favourable
institutional settings in the form of labour and
product market regulations (Van Ark et al.,
2008).
1 Pamfili Antipa is an economist in the Research Department at the Banque de France. Marie-Elisabeth de la
Serve is an economist in the Microeconomic and Structural Analysis Directorate at the Banque de France. The
authors thank Gilbert Cette and Jimmy Lopez for valuable comments and assistance. E-mails:
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The two aforementioned factors are thought
to have played an important role for the differ-
ence in productivity dynamics in the services
sectors. Moreover, a number of authors believe
that it is precisely the services sectors that are
responsible for the bulk of the productivity gap
between the European and Anglo-Saxon econo-
mies. Regarding manufacturing, one finds that
in some European countries this sector is
equally or even more productive than in the
United States (Inklaar et al., 2006). The Com-
mon European market is thought to have played
a key role in that respect.2 As the services sectors
tend to gain economic weight in developed
economies, it has become essential to under-
stand the factors underlying these evolutions.
The sectoral approach we adopt here is further
justified by the heterogeneity of productivity
performance atthe sectoral level, implying
important limitations for the analysis of aggre-
gate data (Jorgenson et al., 2007b).
Following the above, this article focuses on
the financial3 and business services sector4 of a
set of five developed countries (France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
and the United States). The novelty of our anal-
ysis resides in the fact that we concentrate on
both sectoral productivity level gaps and growth
rates. Although there is an abundant body of lit-
erature that analyses sectoral productivity
growth rates, only very few papers treat sectoral
productivity level gaps (Inklaar et al., 2006).
Level gap evaluations allow a direct comparison
of equivalent sectors in different countries. In
addition, they provide valuable information on
how to understand and interpret growth dynam-
ics i.e. they permit detection of possible conver-
gence or catching–up effects (Inklaar et al.,
2006). These effects may be all the more signifi-
cant in branches such as the financial sector
where technological spill-overs are very impor-
tant and markets can be regarded as highly inte-
grated. Our analysis is made possible by a new
data set providing for internationally compara-
ble industry level data and made available by the
EU KLEMS project (Timmer et al., 2007).
We concentrate particularly on the financial
and business services sectors for a number of
reasons. First, and most importantly, the two
sectors are relatively important in size and
account, on average in the five countries, for 6
per cent and 20 per cent respectively of total
value added (see Chart 1a and b). Moreover, as
can be seen from the charts, both sectors and
especially business services display an increasing
share in value added over the 1992-2006 period.
The growing importance of market services can
be explained by a number of interacting factors.
Higher per capita income leads to an increasing
demand for services. In addition, there is an
increasing marketization of traditional house-
hold activities and many manufacturing firms
2 This underlines the importance of a number of measures aimed at creating a single market for services within
the EU, notably the Services Directive and the Lisbon agenda. The Services Directive is an initiative of the
European Commission aimed at creating a single market for services within the EU, similar to the single market
for goods already existing. The Lisbon Strategy aims to make the EU ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowl-
edge-based economy in the world.’ The agenda stresses the need to increase private and public spending on
research (research and development expenditures should attain 3 per cent of GDP), while creating more jobs
(raising the employment rate to 80 per cent), especially high-skilled ones. The agenda also underlines the
need to open up protected sectors, to improve the climate for businesses, to reform labour markets, and to
promote environmentally sustainable growth. So far it seems as if the Agenda is not living up to its ambitions
as stated by the European Commission (2004) and Aghion et al. (2004) for example. 
3 NACE Sub-sectors 65-67 including financial intermediation, central banking, Insurance and Pension fund-
ing and Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation.
4 NACE Sub-sectors 71-74 including renting of machinery and equipment, computer and related activities,
research and development and other business activities (management, legal and accounting services etc.)
We exclude real estate activities as the output of this industry reflects mostly imputed rents whose com-
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out-source more and more business services,
trade and transport activities (Schettkat and
Yocarini, 2005).
In addition to their importance in terms of
value added, the two sectors also cater to other
sectors in the economy by providing essential
services. This means that productivity levels in
those two sectors should have repercussions on
the performance of other sectors in the econ-
omy. One need only think of the consequences
that the functioning of the financial sector can
have on investment decisions, or of the way legal
or accounting services will influence the perfor-
mance of companies in other industries. The
impact of financial systems on growth has been
well established empirically (see for example
Levine, 2005 and de Serres et al., 2006). Numer-
ous studies based on macro or sectoral data find
that financial development5 has a significant
impact on growth, either directly via productiv-
ity, or indirectly via its effect on the build-up of
physical and knowledge capital (Pelgrin et al.,
2002).
In order to illustrate the importance of the
two sectors, we now briefly present aggregate
productivity growth and both sectors’ contribu-
tion to it for the five countries. Our measure of
productivity growth is here limited to the mar-
ket economy, which means that health and edu-
cation services, public administration and
defence are excluded. We also exclude real estate
activities (see footnote 3) and calculate our mea-
sure of productivity as value added over hours
worked.
As presented in Chart 2, productivity growth
has been the highest in the United States over
the 1992-2005 period. Moreover, as mentioned
above, productivity growth accelerated in the
United States, while slowing down in most
European countries. Between 1997 and 2005, it
averaged 2.4 per cent per year in the United
States (versus 1.5 per cent over the 1992-1997
period), but only 1.1 per cent in the United
Kingdom (1.9 per cent over the preceding
period) and 1.6 per cent in Germany (after 2.1
per cent over the preceding period). In France,
productivity growth remained stable (1.5 per
cent over the 1997-2005 period, after 1.4 per
cent initially). The Netherlands was the only
5 Financial development is in most studies measured as the size of financial intermediation or of external
finance relative to GDP. 
Chart 1a
Share of Financial Services in Total Value Added
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one of the four European countries in which
productivity growth increased substantially (2.0
per cent over the 1997-2005 period, after 1.0 per
cent over the preceding period). In summary,
productivity growth accelerated substantially in
the United States and the Netherlands after
1997, remained stable in France, and decreased
in the United Kingdom and Germany.
The contribution of the financial sector to
overall productivity growth over the 1992-2005
period is highest in the United Kingdom (Chart
3a). When looking at sub-periods, this remains
true as the financial sector’s contribution in the
United Kingdom over the second sub-period is
0.5 percentage points per year, after 0.4 percent-
age points in the first sub-period.
However, the increase of the sector’s contri-
bution is largest in the United States where the
contribution doubles from the first to the sec-
ond sub-period reaching 0.4 percentage points.
The contribution of the financial sector also
increased, albeit to a lesser extent, in France and
the Netherlands, and became negative during
the second sub-period in Germany. Conse-
quently, the sector’s contribution increased in all
countries except Germany and doubled in the
United States. 
For the business services sector the contribu-
tion to overall productivity in the 1992-2007
period was the largest in the United Kingdom,
followed by the United States (Chart 3b). This
diagnosis changes, when looking at sub-periods.
For the 1997-2005 period, the sector’s contribu-
tion in the United States was of 0.7 percentage
points per year compared to -0.1 points in the
first sub-period. The sector contributed 0.6 per-
centage points to productivity growth in the
United Kingdom in 1997-2005 (after 0.5 points
initially). In France (0.0 points after -0.1 points)
and the Netherlands (0.1 points after 0.0 points)
the sector’s contributions increased only
slightly, whereas it was negative in both periods
in Germany (-0.2 points). Again, it is the United
States that experienced the largest increase in
the sector’s contribution between sub-periods,
attaining also the highest contribution in the
second sub-period.
An important caveat in the analysis of the con-
tributions of the financial sector and business
services to aggregate productivity growth is that
the measurement of output in these sectors can
be problematic. The measurement of output is
in general much more difficult for services than
in goods producing industries. (Grilliches, 1994,
Chart 2
Aggregate Productivity Growth, 1992 - 2005
Chart 3a
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for instance classified an important part of the
services sector as ‘unmeasurable’.) Most mea-
surement problems hinge on the fact that ser-
vices are intangible and often depend on the
actions of consumers as well as producers. The
measurement of nominal output in market ser-
vices is generally straightforward, as it is mostly
a matter of accurately registering total revenue.
The main difficulty remains, however, the mea-
surement of output volumes since the latter
demands accurate price measurements that have
to be adjusted for changes in the quality of ser-
vices output (Van Ark et al., 2008).
The measurement of banking output is even
more challenging: only a part of banks’ activities
such as fees and commissions earnings can be
measured directly. A large part of the sector’s
output, consisting essentially of the interest rate
spread between loans and deposits, is indirectly
accounted for (and referred to as financial inter-
mediation services indirectly measured or
FISIM).6 In light of these measurement issues,
the results presented further on should be inter-
preted cautiously. 
The remainder of this article is organised as
follows: the next section will briefly outline the
methodology used to construct productivity
growth rates and levels for the sectors of inter-
est. A third section then presents our results for
productivity levels, growth rates and input
growth contributions. The fourth and last part
will offer brief concluding remarks.
Methodology
Growth accounting
The analysis of productivity provided in this
article is based on the standard growth
accounting methodology as developed by
Kuznets, Leontief and Jorgenson. We decom-
pose productivity growth into the contribu-
tions of inputs. In order to obtain these
contributions, we apply the methodology
developed by Jorgenson et al. (2005), summa-
rized in Inklaar and Timmer (2007). We
define productivity as value added per hour
worked. For each industry, value added
growth is computed according to a neoclassi-
cal production function, using labour  ,
ICT capital   and non-ICT capital
. Total Factor productivity   is repre-
sented as a Hicks-neutral augmentation of
aggregate inputs. We have for each industry a
production function defined as:
(1)
Under the assumption of complete use of pro-
duction factors, competitive factor markets and
constant returns to scale (which implies
), gross value added can
be defined as the weighted growth rate of inputs
and total factor productivity (here calculated as a
residual):
6 The interested reader can find more details on measurement issues in the financial sector in Williams et al.
(2009) for the United Kingdom, Fixler and Zieschang (1999) for the United States and Inklaar et al. (2008) for
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(2)
where   is the two-period average share of
input type   in nominal value added. Capital ser-
vices are defined as the aggregate of the individ-
ual capital stocks weighted by the asset’s
compensation share in total capital compensa-
tion:
(3)
where   denotes the two-period average share
of asset type j in total nominal capital compensa-
tion. For our analysis we distinguish between
two types of capital: ICT capital (communica-
tion equipment, computing equipment, and
software) and Non-ICT capital (transport, other
machinery and equipment, and non-residential
structures).
The change in labour composition is defined
as the difference between the growth of labour
inputs and the growth of total hours worked:
(4)
where   is the labour input index, aggre-
gated over the h labour types using labour
compensation shares and   is total hours
worked summed over the different labour
types.
In order to obtain labour productivity growth,
we use value added per hour worked (va = VA/
H). Capital input is also expressed in terms of
hours worked (k = K/H) and TFP growth is sim-
ply deduced as a residual:
(5)
Level gaps accounting
In order to compare productivity levels across
countries, we use a methodology proposed by
Inklaar and Timmer (2007). We assume that the
production function is identical between coun-
tries.7 Consequently, equation (5) can be used
with time subscripts replaced with country sub-
scripts (the United States is the reference coun-
try).
(6)
Until recently, comparisons of productivity
levels by industry have been hampered by the
lack of a comprehensive dataset for Purchas-
ing Power Parities (PPPs) for industry out-
puts and inputs. Indeed, any reasonable
comparison of industry performance in differ-
ent countries needs a comprehensive set of
industry-specific PPPs, as they are required to
transform national output and input measures
into internationally comparable quantity
indexes. For the purposes of this study we use
a new dataset made available by the EU-
KLEMS project. This dataset provides indus-
try PPPs for the year 1997 and covers 45
industries at the 2-digit level. The gross out-
put PPPs have been made transitive by apply-





































































































7 This assumption entails that the technological frontier is the same for all sample countries and that produc-
tion sets differ across countries only because of differences in factor endowments. This hypothesis is in line
with standard neoclassical trade theory and goes hand in hand with the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale. 
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all OECD countries.8 The sample of countries
we will here concentrate on consists of
France, Germany, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and the United States, the
latter being the sample’s reference country.
Based on the EU-KLEMS dataset for gross
output PPPs we construct, in a first step, PPPs
for value added. The latter are based on the
relation between gross output and value added
as defined in national input output tables
(Gross Output – Intermediate Consumption =
Value Added). Analytically this gives the fol-
lowing expression, used also in a number of
other articles on the subject (e.g. Inklaar et al.,
2006; Rao et al., 2004).
(7)
Where   and   are the relative price lev-
els of gross output in country C and the USA
respectively,   and   the relative price lev-
els of value added,   and   the relative
price levels for intermediate inputs and the
share of value added in gross output averaged
between the country in question and the refer-
ence country, in our case the United States.
Based on this expression, it is necessary to
calculate PPPs for intermediate inputs. The
methodology we follow is outlined in great
detail in Inklaar and Timmer (2007). For the
computation of intermediate input PPPs, we
assume that the price of a good is independent
of its use. Thus, we calculate intermediate
input PPPs for the two industries in question,
by aggregating gross output PPPs of the deliv-
ering industries weighted by their importance
in the industry’s total intermediate inputs. In
addition, PPPs for intermediate inputs should
reflect the costs of purchasing intermediate
deliveries, and should hence be based on pur-
chasers’ prices. As the PPPs for gross output
in our data set are based on basic prices, we
have to adjust the gross output PPPs for trans-
port and trade margins and net taxes. Data on
margins and net taxes are only available for
commodities and not by industry. In order to
obtain information on pricing behaviour in a
particular industry, we aggregate margins for
commodities by their weight in the industry’s
output. Note that our analysis is based on pair
wise comparisons of countries vis-à-vis the
United States so all ratios are bilateral. Table
1 shows the intermediate input and the result-
ing value added PPPs relative to the market
exchange rate. For instance, when comparing
Germany’s intermediate input PPP in finance
with the one for the United States (normal-
ized to 1), one can see that inputs in Germany
are more expensive than in the United States.
As it can be seen from the Tables 1 and 2,
intermediate consumption is more expensive
in the four European countries than in the
United States. But whether value added will
be more or less ‘expensive’ than in the refer-
ence country depends not only on relative
prices for intermediate inputs and outputs,
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PPP II 1.23 1.14 1.01 1.07 1
PPP GO 1.02 1.06 0.82 0.82 1






PPP II 1.17 1.19 1.14 1.18 1
PPP GO 1.85 1.40 1.40 1.30 1
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but also on the weight intermediate inputs and
value added have in gross output. The latter
differs not only by country, but also by indus-
try. Indeed, the share of value added in gross
output is on average 5 percentage points
higher in finance than in business services.
Compared to the United States, value added
is less ‘expensive’ in finance in all sample
countries except Germany. Hence, when
applying the PPP for value added to the mea-
sure of value added as given in national input
output tables, the resulting quantity will be
bigger than the initial value for France, the
UK and the Netherlands, but will be smaller
for Germany.
In contrast, the usual measures of value added in
the business sector given in national input output
tables will be divided by the PPPs derived above.
Hence, quantity indices of value added in the busi-
ness sector will be smaller than the initial unad-
justed values found in national input output tables.
The computation of PPPs for capital inputs
are based on the method proposed by Jorgenson
and Nishimizu (1978). The PPPs for capital ser-
vices are based on PPPs for investment provided
by Eurostat and the OECD. These PPPs for
investment are adjusted by the ratio of user costs
of capital between countries (which depends on
capital’s rate of return, depreciation rates and
investment price changes). For our analysis we
use capital input PPPs as calculated by Inklaar
and Timmer (2007).
The PPPs for labour input are based on the
methodology proposed by Jorgenson and
Grilliches (1967), which involves aggregating
relative wages across different labour types
using labour compensation shares for each
labour type as weights. For this purpose we
distinguish between three labour categories:
high-skilled (university graduates), medium-
skilled (roughly higher education below
degree), and low-skilled (no formal qualifica-
tions). The resulting quantity indices for
inputs and outputs and the subsequent pro-
ductivity levels are presented in the next sec-
tion of the article.
Results for level and growth 
accounting
Finance
Productivity levels – differentials and 
input contributions
Table 3 shows the productivity differential
and the input contributions to it for the financial
sector in the sample countries vis-à-vis the
United States in 1997 and 2005.
In 1997, we find that the productivity level in
the financial sector in the Netherlands is 23.0 per
cent higher than in the United States. This differ-
ence is due to the positive contributions of non-
ICT capital (13.0 points), TFP (10.4 points) and
ICT capital (0.4 points) and to the negative con-
tribution of labour composition (-0.7 points).
More generally, productivity levels in the
financial sector in 1997 in the four European
Table 3
Sources of the Gap in Labour Productivity 
in the Financial Services Sector
(value added per hour worked, gap measured as percentage 







12.4 -8.8 23.0 7.8
Contributions from
Labour Composition 3.0 -3.1 -0.7 -4.0
ICT Capital -1.3 -0.8 0.4 -1.6
Non-ICT Capital -8.2 6.2 13.0 -11.7




15.2 -32.9 23.0 16.6
Contributions from
Labour Composition 6.4 -2.4 3.2 -2.4
ICT Capital 4.9 -7.5 0.7 0.2
Non-ICT Capital -1.4 4.7 3.3 -11.6
TFP 5.2 -27.7 15.7 30.374 NUMBER 19, SPRING 2010 
countries except for Germany are higher than
in the United States. This is the case although
the contribution of labour composition is
negative in three of the countries (the excep-
tion is France). The contribution of labour
composition is negative because the share of
hours worked by the highly skilled in total
hours worked is at least two times higher in
the United States (40 per cent) than in the
other countries.9 Also, it should be under-
lined, that ICT capital’s contribution to
labour productivity is higher in the United
States than in the European countries, except
in the Netherlands, a fact confirmed by
numerous other studies (Inklaar et al., 2005).
Germany is the only country among the four
European countries with a lower level of labour
productivity in the financial sector than the
United States. This is due to a negative contribu-
tion of TFP in 1997, while TFP’s contribution is
highly positive in the other three countries.
Although the underlying explanations behind
Germany’s negative TFP performance are
beyond the scope of this analysis, an important
reason might be the financial sector’s high degree
of fragmentation. Indeed, Germany’s banking
landscape is shaped by many small and often
state-run banks (Sparkassen, Landesbanken) ham-
pering the diffusion of positive externalities and
the realization of returns to scale due to agglom-
eration or size effects. For a sample of German
and Italian banks, Fiorentino et al. (2009) find
that the privatized banks indeed experienced a
significant increase in productivity.
The second part of Table 3 shows the pro-
ductivity differential and the input contribu-
tions to it for the financial sector in the
sample countries vis-à-vis the United States in
2005. Between 1997 and 2005, France and the
United Kingdom increased their lead on the
United States and the Netherlands-US gap
remained unchanged. In the Netherlands, all
components contributed positively to the pro-
ductivity differential, but TFP’s contribution
was by far the most significant. TFP growth
and to a lesser extent ICT capital were the
principal drivers behind the increase in the
UK’s productivity differential vis-à-vis the
United States (here the differential in favour
of the United Kingdom actually doubled).
In 2005, Germany continued to be the only
one of the four countries with a lower level of
labour productivity in the financial sector than
the United States. Between 1997 and 2005 the
negative differential vis-à-vis the United States
more than tripled from 8.8 percentage points to
32.9 points, with lower TFP the single most
important driver of this development. In Ger-
many, negative contributions come from all
inputs except non-ICT capital accumulation. A
classical explanation for the negative contribu-
tion of ICT capital would be an institutional
framework that does not allow firms the organi-
sational flexibility needed to benefit fully from
ICT capital (Gust and Marquez, 2003). The
negative effects induced by the composition of
Germany’s labour force could also hamper pro-
ductivity growth in the German financial sector,
as a certain level of qualification is needed to
reap the full benefits of ICT diffusion. The
highly negative TFP contribution could also
reflect the structure of the German banking sec-
tor (see preceding paragraph). The latter has
changed very little, whereas the liberalization of
financial markets advanced considerably in the
other sample countries. Given this first set of
results, the financial sector does not seem to
account for the EU’s negative productivity dif-
ferential vis-à-vis the United States, but might
contribute to it in the case of Germany. 
9 Cette and Bourles (2007) find that observed productivity measures can be biased. Using a model that takes
into account diminishing returns to hours worked, they show that ‘structural’ estimates of hourly productivity
growth for several European countries are 10-15 percentage point below observed measures. These estimates
assign some role to labor market institutions in explaining Europe’s productivity performance. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 75
Productivity growth and input 
contributions
Over the first sub-period (1992-1997), Table 4
shows that ICT capital contributed heavily to
labour productivity growth in the financial sec-
tor for all five countries. In contrast, the non-
ICT capital contribution was less significant and
even negative in the Netherlands. The most sig-
nificant factor behind productivity growth in
Germany and the United Kingdom was TFP
growth, probably going hand in hand with
financial market liberalization. Surprisingly,
TFP growth was negative in the United States.
Over the second sub-period (1997-2005),
labour productivity growth in the financial sec-
tor was very strong in all countries except Ger-
many, where it was negative. Labour
productivity growth accelerated relative to
1992-97 in all countries except the United King-
dom, where the rate of productivity growth
remains still high (3.9 per cent per year) and
Germany, where it fell 4.3 percentage points. In
all countries, the principal driver of labour pro-
ductivity growth was ICT capital accumulation,
as was largely the case during the preceding
period. Note that labour composition’s contri-
bution was smallest in the United States. In fact,
absolute labour input growth (measured by total
hours worked) increased the most in the United
States. But, at the same time, the share of hours
worked by the low-skilled increased only in the
United States, while decreasing in the four
European countries.
In summary, we observe that in 1992-1997 the
labour productivity growth differential in the
financial sector vis-à-vis the United States was
positive for three of the four European countries
(France was the exception) and that in 1997-
2005 it was positive for two countries (the excep-
tions were Germany, where growth was nega-
tive, and the Netherlands, where growth was the
same as in the United States). In both periods,
the main drivers of labour productivity growth
generally were ICT capital and TFP growth to
some extent, the latter reflecting most probably
structural features of the respective economies.
In addition, TFP contributions exhibited in the
majority of countries a downward trend between
periods. Irrespective of the underlying growth
drivers, it is, however, not the financial sector
that accounts for the aggregate labour produc-
tivity growth differential in favour of the United
States. Moreover, observed growth patterns and
drivers of the financial sector are similar across
countries. This could be due to the fact that
financial markets are quite homogeneous and
integrated. One way to corroborate this intu-
ition is to look at intermediate consumption
(Inklaar and Timmer, 2007). Intermediate ser-
vice consumptions are usually higher in the
United States than in other countries. Yet, look-
ing at the different types of intermediate con-
sumption (material, energy, and services), we
find that the structures in the financial sectors
are quasi-identical across countries. This
implies that the degree to which services are
Table 4
Sources of Labour Productivity Growth 
in Financial Services










Productivity 0.0 3.0 2.2 4.9 2.0
Contributions from
Labour Composition 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
ICT Capital 0.5 0.9 1.5 1.2 1.6
Non-ICT Capital 0.0 0.5 -0.1 0.5 0.7
TFP -1.0 1.2 0.4 2.9 -0.4
1997-2005
Productivity 3.0 -1.3 2.7 3.9 2.7
Contributions from
Labour Composition 1.2 0.6 1.5 0.8 0.4
ICT Capital 1.2 0.8 1.9 1.8 1.8
Non-ICT Capital 0.4 0.1 -0.7 0.1 0.3
TFP 0.2 -2.8 0.0 1.2 0.176 NUMBER 19, SPRING 2010 
outsourced is similar across the financial sectors
of the five countries.
The financial sector’s productivity 
performance in the light of the 
current turmoil
As seen above, TFP growth, along with ICT
capital, is an important driver of labour produc-
tivity growth in the financial sector. TFP growth
is calculated as a residual. Hence, it captures
intangible assets such as organizational effi-
ciency and technological progress. It can also
reflect more or less favourable institutional set-
tings in the form of product and labour market
regulations. Last but not least, TFP growth may
simply be ‘a measure of our ignorance’ as Abra-
movitz put it. In that spirit and in light of the
current financial turmoil, TFP growth, or at
least parts of it, could as well be related to evolu-
tions in the financial sector that have little to do
with the sectors’ fundamentals. In particular,
TFP growth may be influenced by over-evalua-
tions of assets prices, which inflated value added
artificially and which will prove transitory, or
indeed may have already proven transitory with
the economic crisis.
In Table 5 we compare annual average pro-
ductivity growth and TFP’s contribution to it
over the two sub-periods (1992-1997 and 1997-
2005). In comparison to the first sub-period, the
second one was relatively turbulent as a major
crises, the dot-com bubble, took place. In addi-
tion, measures applied to the financial sector
might have been biased by the build-up to what
would become the financial crisis of 2007. When
interpreting TFP growth as a factor capturing
evolutions that are not reflected by the varia-
tions of explicit production factors, one would
therefore assume that TFP growth would have
been more important during the second sub-
period. This is, however, not the case. TFP
growth’s contribution to productivity growth
decreased between the two sub-periods in all
countries except the United States and France.
These results suggest that there is little reason
to believe that our measures of productivity
growth were more fragile to excessive develop-
ments in the financial sector in the second sub-
period. That said, the general fragility related to
TFP measures for financial sectors applies to
our computations, implying that our results
have to be interpreted cautiously.
Table 5
Labour Productivity Growth and TFP Contributions 
in Financial Services, 1992-1997 and 1997-2005










Labour productivity  0.0 3.0 2.2 4.9 2.0
TFP -1.0 1.2 0.4 2.9 -0.4
1997-2005
Labour productivity  3.0 -1.3 2.7 3.9 2.7
TFP 0.2 -2.8 0.0 1.2 0.1
Table 6
Sources of the Gap in Labour Productivity 
in Business Services
(value added per hour worked, gap measured as 







-14.1 2.7 -16.4 -30.3
Contributions from
Labour Composition -2.8 -9.1 7.6 -8.2
ICT Capital 0.8 1.7 -1.4 -1.6
Non-ICT Capital 8.1 26.6 2.2 -3.6




-28.4 -21.4 -24.3 -32.6
Contributions from
Labour Composition -3.9 -9.5 9.7 -10.8
ICT Capital 1.7 -7.3 -7.6 -7.1
Non-ICT Capital 8.0 20.6 0.4 -3.2
TFP -34.2 -25.2 -26.8 -11.4INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 77
Business Services
Productivity levels – differentials and 
input contributions
Regarding labour productivity levels in busi-
ness services, our results are found in Table 6. In
1997, the productivity level for all countries
except Germany were well below that in United
States (per cent gaps ranged from -14.1 per cent
in France to -30.3 pent cent in the United King-
dom). In Germany, the labour productivity level
in business services was 2.7 per cent higher than
in the United States. The contribution of labour
composition to the gap differed significantly
across countries: it was negative in all countries
except in Netherlands. The contribution of ICT
capital to the gap was small in all four countries,
being slightly positive in Germany and France
and slightly negative in the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands. In addition, TFP’s contribution
is highly negative in all countries. Non-ICT cap-
ital is particularly significant in Germany, being
the single factor explaining the positive produc-
tivity differential vis-à-vis the United States.
In 2005, labour productivity differentials in
business services for all four European countries
were highly negative in comparison to the United
States, with the gap increasing in all four countries.
A greater negative contribution to the gap from
TFP was the most important reason behind this
evolution in France and Germany, reflecting prob-
ably less pro-growth institutional settings and dif-
ferences in organisational efficiency. However,
when interpreting these results, one should bear in
mind that the business services sector is very heter-
ogeneous, covering various domains of economic
activity (legal, accounting, design and translation
activities, management and advertising, scientific
and market research). ICT capital’s contribution to
the labour productivity gap in 2005 was negative in
all countries except France. Non-ICT capital’s
contribution was negative only in the United
Kingdom. Labour composition effects remain
negative in all countries except the Netherlands.
Productivity growth and input 
contributions
In 1992-1997, labour productivity growth in
business services was negative in all countries
except the United Kingdom. Over this period,
labour composition’s contribution to labour
productivity growth was small, but positive in all
countries except the Netherlands where it was
zero. This was related to the increase in the
share of hours worked by the highly skilled.
Both ICT and non-ICT capital contribute posi-
tively to labour productivity growth (except in
the Netherlands where non-ICT capital made a
negative contribution). Last but not least, TFP
was an important growth driver of labour pro-
ductivity in business services, but in the negative
sense in all countries except the United King-
dom. Coupled with the fact that the sector is
quite labour intensive, this underlines the
importance of structural features such as the
regulations on product and labour markets. In
addition, TFP growth can be negatively affected
by financing conditions, as found by Estevao and
Severo (2010), since financial shocks can distort
the allocation of factors across firms within an
industry.
In 1997-2005, labour productivity growth in the
business services sector varied significantly across
countries, ranging from 3.1 per cent per year in the
United States and 3.0 per cent in the United King-
dom to -1.8 per cent in Germany. This is in line
with changes in the productivity differentials
between 1997 and 2005 as found in Table 6, which
showed an increase in the US advantage. In Ger-
many and France, labour productivity growth was
identical, and negative, in both sub-periods,
underlying the need of structural reforms in the
market services, in line with the Lisbon Strategy.
More generally, the contribution of labour compo-
sition to labour productivity growth was positive in
all countries in 1997-2005, since the share of hours
worked by the highly skilled increased substan-
tially in all countries. The contribution of ICT78 NUMBER 19, SPRING 2010 
capital was somewhat greater in most countries
than in 1992-1997. It is important to note that the
contribution of ICT capital was particularly
important in the United States (around three times
the contribution of ICT Capital in France). In
addition, in all countries except the United States
and the United Kingdom TFP growth was nega-
tive. This may suggest an absence of hampering
institutional settings in these two countries.
The key development in business services
between the 1992-1997 and 1997-2005 periods
was the massive 3.9 percentage-point accelera-
tion of labour productivity in the United States
(from -0.8 per cent per year to 3.1 per cent per
year). There was no change in labour productiv-
ity growth in France and Germany between
periods, while labour productivity growth
picked up in the Netherlands and fell in the
United Kingdom, albeit from a high growth
rate. The importance of ICT capital and TFP
growth for the business services sector should be
underlined. The interpretation of the latter
should however, be undertaken with caution.
Over the period under consideration produc-
tivity levels and growth rates in the European
countries of our sample lag very much behind
those in the United States. There can be no doubt
that, given the sector’s importance and size, it
accounts for a large part of the productivity dif-
ferential between the United States and the Euro-
pean countries (see also the introduction for the
computations of the sectors’ contribution to the
productivity growth rate of the overall market
economy). Moreover, given the productivity level
gaps, we can exclude possible catching-up effects
as an underlying reason for the diverging growth
dynamics across the sample countries. Subse-
quently, possible explanations for the increasing
US productivity lead in business services include
greater ICT capital accumulation and positive
effects of a higher percentage of skilled workers
on average, both related to more favourable insti-
tutional settings. Given these results, the swift
implementation for the Services Directive could
prove to be an important step towards narrowing
the productivity differential in business services
vis-à-vis the United States.
Conclusion
This article employs a sectoral approach to
productivity level gaps and growth rates. The
first part of our exercise consisted of computing
productivity levels for the years 1997 and 2005
for the financial and business services sectors of
five advanced economies (France, Germany, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States). We found that productivity lev-
els in the sample countries’ financial sectors are
very similar and that the European countries do
not seem to lag behind the United States.
Indeed, our measures imply that productivity
levels (value added per hour worked) in the
European financial sectors are actually higher
than in the United States. This situation may be
explained by lower regulatory barriers to com-
petition in the banking sector: all the European
Table 7
Business Services, Productivity Growth 
and Input Contributions










Productivity -0.1 -1.8 -0.3 3.3 -0.8
Contributions from
Labour Composition 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.2
ICT Capital 0.5 1.0 0.3 1.1 1.2
Non-ICT Capital 0.9 1.1 -0.5 0.2 0.4
T F P - 2 . 0- 4 . 4- 0 . 11 . 7- 2 . 6
1997-2005
Productivity -0.1 -1.8 0.8 3.0 3.1
Contributions from
Labour Composition 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.4
ICT Capital 0.5 1.4 0.7 1.5 1.9
Non-ICT Capital 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5
TFP -1.6 -4.0 -0.9 0.7 0.3INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 79
countries of our sample were less regulated than
the United States in 2003, and a regulatory envi-
ronment that is conductive to competition has a
significant positive impact on sectoral output
and potential growth (de Serres et al., 2006).
This is true for all countries but Germany where
productivity levels are substantially lower. We
believe that one important factor behind Ger-
many’s poor performance is the high degree of
fragmentation of its financial system, the small
size of its institutions impeding on their returns
to scale.
Nevertheless, our results should be inter-
preted with caution. We have calculated TFP as
a residual and the classical explanation for TFP
is that it reflects primarily more or less favour-
able institutional settings. The distinction
between prices and volumes being an uneasy
undertaking for the financial sector (see the
introduction for a discussion of measurement
issues of output in finance), a different reading
would be that TFP simply reflects errors in our
computations or the omission of one or several
explanatory variables (intangible assets being
one possibility). Bearing in mind these con-
straints, our results still support the view that it
is not the financial sector(s) that is responsible
for Europe’s negative productivity differential
vis-à-vis the United States.
In terms of labour growth rates in the financial
sector, the principal drivers are ICT capital and
TFP growth. This is the case for all five countries
and in both sub-periods. In addition, when exam-
ining the two sub-periods, we observe that pro-
ductivity growth accelerated somewhat in the
second period (1997-2005) in line with increasing
contributions of ICT capital.
Regarding business services, productivity level
gaps vary significantly. But one should bear in
mind that this sector is very heterogeneous in its
composition and covers various domains of eco-
nomic activity (legal, accounting, design and
translation activities, management and advertis-
ing, scientific and market research). Market
structure varies across countries, and this hetero-
geneity between European economies is for
instance underlined by the OECD’s PMR indica-
tor (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). Labour pro-
ductivity levels in the business services sectors of
European countries are generally substantially
below the US level. This is not the case in Ger-
many where productivity was well above the
other countries in 1992-1997; however, this
proved to be transitory as in 2005, the productiv-
ity level in the German business services sector
converged to the level of other European coun-
tries and was below that of the United States.
Given this sector’s importance in total value
added, we believe that the business services sector
accounts for a large part of the EU’s negative pro-
ductivity differential vis-à-vis the USA. This con-
clusion seems to be broadly in line with the
findings of numerous other authors such as Van
Ark et al. (2008).
Labour productivity growth rates for the
business services sector vary significantly
across countries, implying different trends in
TFP growth. The contribution of ICT capital
is important in all countries. However, it must
be borne in mind that the positive effects of
ICT capital accumulation will also depend on
intangible factors such as organizational effi-
ciency or educational levels and life-long
learning (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003). Also,
in contrast with to the financial sector, labour
productivity growth in business services did
not accelerate during the second sub-period
(1997-2005) except in the Netherlands and
the United States. This implies that the
observed labour productivity growth patterns
cannot be explained by catch-up effects.
Nonetheless, given the sector’s importance
for the national economies, our results imply
that the sectors’ poor performance contrib-
uted to the EU’s negative productivity differ-
ential vis-à-vis the United States.80 NUMBER 19, SPRING 2010 
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